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THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES ACT AND THE
VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
ALBERT L. NORTON, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA)' is
South Carolina's version of model legislation developed by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and adopted by the Commit-
tee on Suggested State Legislation of the Council on State Gov-
ernments.2 The UTPA has its roots in the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act (FTC Act).3 Both prohibit unfair methods of
competition and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in
commerce.
4
No private cause of action exists under the federal act.5 The
FTC encourages state adoption of legislation such as the UTPA
("Little FTC Acts") because it does not have the resources to
police unfair acts or practices. Thus, the FTC Act and individual
state acts are designed to be complementary. State acts provide
private causes of action for abusive commercial practices at the
local level, referring to the federal act for guidance. The opera-
tive portion of the UTPA provides:
(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
* Associate, Long, Aldridge & Norman, Atlanta, Georgia; B.S., 1981, Clemson
University; J.D., 1987, University of South Carolina. The author expresses gratitude to
Mr. C. Richard Kelly for his assistance in this article, although the conclusions expressed
are not necessarily those of Mr. Kelly.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
2. See generally Day, The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping
Giant or Illusive Panacea?, 33 S.C.L. REv. 479 (1982).
3. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 1973 & Supp. 1988).
4. The federal act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices "in or affecting
commerce," id. § 45(a)(1), while the UTPA prohibits such activity "in the conduct of any
trade or commerce." S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
5. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v.
Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
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hereby declared unlawful.
(b) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing para-
graph (a) of this section the courts will be guided by the inter-
pretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the
Federal Courts to [section] 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)), as from time to time
amended.'
The words of proscription are broad, potentially encompass-
ing a wide range of conduct, including conduct not yet examined
by any court. The language of section 39-5-20 arguably is too
broad to apprise potential violators that their conduct is unlaw-
ful. Defendants frequently argue that a lack of sufficient notice
deprives them of their right to due process.
The purpose of this article is to examine the UTPA, partic-
ularly the "unfair or deceptive acts or practice" language, in
light of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Further, it is argued
that the UTPA is unconstitutional.
I. COMPARISON OF FTC ACT AND THE UTPA
The South Carolina Supreme Court disposed of the vague-
ness issue in a remarkably summary fashion in Inman v. Ken
Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.7 The entire text of the court's
opinion on this issue is as follows:
Dealer [Defendant] challenges the constitutionality of the
UTPA, [section] 39-5-20, which provides:
(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
Dealer contends this prohibition is unconstitutionally vague
because it does not specify what acts are unlawful.
We reject this contention. The federal act, upon which our
state UTPA is based, has long been upheld against this chal-
lenge. The United States Supreme Court has held the determi-
nation of what acts constitute "unfair methods of competition"
is a matter of law for the courts to decide. Unfair trade prac-
tices are defined by common law. We hold [section] 39-5-20 is
not unconstitutionally vague.8
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
7. 294 S.C. 240, 363 S.E.2d 691 (1988).
8. Id. at 243, 363 S.E.2d at 693 (citations omitted).
2
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Not included in the court's analysis are a number of signifi-
cant due process considerations. Most important, perhaps, is the
fundamental procedural difference between the FTC Act and
the UTPA.9
The FTC Act dictates a procedure by which the FTC may
issue a complaint to offending business entities to protect the
public's interest. Next, the party complained of has the opportu-
nity to show cause why a cease-and-desist order should not be
issued by the FTC.10 The order is reviewable in a circuit court of
appeals and is subject to review by the Supreme Court upon writ
of certiorari." Each violation of the order carries a civil penalty
of $10,000, recoverable in a civil action brought by the United
States Attorney General in a district court. 2 A defending busi-
ness entity is liable only when it violates a cease-and-desist or-
der with actual knowledge that its activity is unlawful under
subsection (a)(1) of the FTC Act."3
In contrast, the UTPA, South Carolina's "Little FTC Act,"
embodies three avenues of enforcement: (1) judicial proceedings
by the state attorney general seeking injunctive relief; (2) direct
action by the state attorney general seeking a civil penalty; and
(3) a private cause of action by individuals.
Under section 39-5-50, the South Carolina Attorney General
is required to give three days' notice to a party against whom
proceedings are contemplated. The notice allows the defendant
an opportunity to show cause why the attorney general should
not seek a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, or
permanent injunction against the allegedly offensive act or prac-
tice. "'4 Any violation of one of these orders may subject the viola-
tor to a $15,000 civil penalty.' 5
The civil penalties section of the UTPA also provides for a
lesser penalty, $5,000, for "any person [who] is willfully using or
9. In Inman the South Carolina Supreme Court cited Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919), as authority supporting the constitutionality of this
FTC Act, which was attacked on vagueness grounds. See id.
10. See 15 U.S.CA. § 45(b) (West 1973 & Supp. 1988) (FTC has authority to issue
cease-and-desist order).
11. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(c) (West 1973).
12. See 15 U.S.CA § 45(11) (West 1973 & Supp. 1988).
13. See id. § 45(m)(1)(B).
14. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
15. See id. § 39-5-110(b).
1989]
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has willfully used a method, act or practice declared unlawful."16
Under this penalty provision, different procedural precautions
apply. The penalty is recoverable by the state attorney general
upon petition to the court if the court finds the violation "will-
ful."17 A willful violation occurs "when the party committing the
violation knew or should have known that his conduct was a vio-
lation" of the prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices.18 Nevertheless, the structure of the Act indicates that vio-
lation of an injunction is not necessary for the attorney general
to recover a civil penalty. 9
Section 39-5-140 provides a private cause of action. 0 If a
court finds that the violation of the prohibition of deceptive acts
or practices was "willful," the plaintiff may recover treble dam-
ages. As under the federal statute, a willful violation occurs
"when the party committing the violation knew or should have
known that his conduct was a violation" of the prohibition of
unfair or deceptive acts or practices.21
The latter two avenues of enforcement of the UTPA raise
due process concerns; in both actions a defendant may be called
on to account for his conduct when that conduct may not have
been clearly unlawful.
The UTPA prohibitions are intentionally vague, to include
untried inventive schemes to deceive consumers. The constitu-
tionality of an action to enforce the UTPA is questionable be-
cause the defendant is subjected to a fine that arguably is penal
in nature. This fact notwithstanding, the virtually identical lan-
guage of the FTC Act withstood this constitutional attack in
1919 in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.22
Because there has been no further challenge since this case, ap-
parently the vagueness of the language alone does not create a
burning issue. The UTPA, however, contains the same proscrip-
tive words without the procedural precautions found in the FTC
Act. Arguably, therefore, the vagueness of the UTPA's proscrip-
tion is not cured by procedural precautions.
16. Id. § 39-5-110(a).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 39-5-110(c).
19. See Day, supra note 2, at 506.
20. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
21. Id. § 39-5-140(d).
22. 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
644 [Vol. 40
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The UTPA allows recovery of punitive awards only on a
showing of willful violation. This requirement possibly cures the
vagueness of the proscription, but the point is certainly open to
controversy, especially as long as "willful" requires something
less than actual knowledge.
Thus, there are three troublesome characteristics of the
UTPA that must be examined together to reach a conclusion re-
garding the statute's constitutionality. The three factors are: (1)
the intentionally broad language; (2) the punitive treble dam-
ages provision; and (3) the lack of procedural precautions. Part
II of this article will examine how other jurisdictions have ruled
on the constitutionality of statutes similar to the UTPA. Part III
will discuss the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
II. PRECEDENT
In Sears, Roebuck the Seventh Circuit disposed of the
vagueness issue by noting that the challenged phrase "unfair
methods of competition" was no more indefinite than "due pro-
cess of law."'23 The court of appeals indicated concern that a
finding of vagueness would invalidate a number of similarly
vague statutory terms and concluded that those terms "are suffi-
ciently accurate measures of conduct. ' 24 Cases testing the
UTPA's sister acts in other jurisdictions generally uphold their
constitutionality. In many cases, however, important variations
in the structure of the statutes should be noted.
25
One of the earliest state cases deciding the vagueness issue
is State v. Reader's Digest Association26 in which the Washing-
ton Supreme Court ruled that the state Consumer Protection
Act 27 was not void for vagueness. 8 The Reader's Digest court
relied primarily on the existence of established federal trade reg-
ulation precedent, despite the court's observation that the
23. Id. at 311.
24. Id.
25. The South Carolina Court of Appeals stated in Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country
Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 477, 351 S.E.2d 347, 349 (Ct.
App. 1986), "Our research has not shown that any state has an unfair trade practices act
identical to our own."
26. 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972), cert. dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973).
27. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010-.920 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
28. 81 Wash. 2d at 275, 501 P.2d at 301.
1989]
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Washington Act did not adopt federal precedent, but merely in-
structed courts to be guided by federal precedent. Significantly,
the court in Reader's Digest recognized the argument that the
challenged act differed from the FTC Act procedurally because
the Washington Act arguably did not provide a defendant with
sufficient notice of his unlawful conduct before assessing a civil
penalty. The court noted: "We do not reach the question of
whether the imposition of a 'civil penalty,' prior to a judicial de-
termination that an activity constitutes. . . an 'unfair or decep-
tive act or practice,' denies procedural due process."2
The Washington Supreme Court, however, reached the issue
a year later in State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc.30 After authorizing suit for penalties "alone and
separate" from injunctions, the court found the Washington
statute to have a sufficiently established meaning "to meet any
constitutional challenge of vagueness.""1
At first glance Ralph Williams, read together with Reader's
Digest, appears to be significant authority favoring the constitu-
tionality of the UTPA. Both cases found virtually identical
words not to be overly vague, and procedural precautions like
those in the FTC Act were deemed unnecessary to support that
conclusion. The words of the Washington Act were not strictly
construed under the standards for penal statutes, however, since
the court in Ralph Williams ruled that the statute was remedial
rather than penal.2 Thus, the Washington Act was upheld as
against two of the three characteristics that may make applica-
tion of the South Carolina UTPA objectionable.
In Pennington v. Singleton33 the Texas Supreme Court con-
strued language similar to that of the UTPA and upheld its con-
stitutionality. Texas's Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Pro-
tection Act (DTPA)34 prohibits "[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." 35
Section 17.46(b) of the DTPA lists a variety of prohibited acts
29. Id. at 272, 501 P.2d at 299.
30. 82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d 233 (1973), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 952 (1977).
31. Id. at 279, 510 P.2d at 242 (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 278, 510 P.2d at 242.
33. 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
34. 4 TEx. Bus. & COM. Corm ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987).
35. Id. § 17-46(a).
[Vol. 40
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and practices." The appellant in Pennington claimed that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague because many of the acts
listed in that "laundry list" resulted in treble damage liability
without a showing that the defendant intended to deceive or
knowingly made false representations. The Pennington court ac-
knowledged that most of the subdivisions of section 17.46(b) did
not require a showing of intent. The court nonetheless reasoned
that intent was not a constitutional requirement because impos-
ing an intent requirement would not make the proscribed con-
duct more definite.
37
The UTPA differs from the DTPA because it does not in-
clude the twenty-three item nonexclusive laundry list found in
the Texas statute s.3  For this reason, the UTPA is less specific.
The UTPA, however, allows treble damages only upon proof of
an intentional violation.3 9 Thus, comparing the UTPA with the
DTPA, the UTPA is stronger on the intent requirement al-
though weaker on the enumeration of specifically prohibited
practices.
The Supreme Court of Alaska also dealt with the vagueness
issue in State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc.4 ° The court upheld
the constitutionality of Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act,41 whose operative words are identical
to the UTPA. The Alaska statute is similar to the Texas statute
in that it includes a nonexclusive laundry list of prohibited prac-
tices42 and refers to the FTC Act for guidance. 43 The O'Neill In-
vestigations court found the statute's reference to the FTC Act
very persuasive. The existence of the FTC Act, reasoned the
court, gave the words a "fixed meaning. 4 4 Further, FTC adjudi-
cation made up for the state attorney general's failure to pro-
36. See id. § 17-46(b) (listing 24 prohibited acts).
37. See 606 S.W.2d at 689.
38. The UTPA, however, does enumerate two types of acts specifically designated
as unfair trade practices in §§ 39-5-30 and -35. Those sections do not mention intent
because these practices, like any other, are actionable under § 39-5-140, which specifi-
cally imposes an intent requirement.
39. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
40. 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980).
41. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471-.561 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
42. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.5.531 (1986).
43. Id. § 45.50.545.
44. 609 P.2d at 532.
19891 647
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mulgate guiding regulation.45
The requirement of intent to violate the statutory proscrip-
tion was not at issue in O'Neill Investigations. Actual damages
are trebled under the Alaska statute only "in cases of wilful vio-
lation,"'16 as under the UTPA. The list of proscribed practices in
O'Neill Investigations was not relevant to the decision because
the debt collection practices at issue were not among those spe-
cifically proscribed practices.47
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act48 in Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, Interna-
tional.49 Scott was an appeal from an action brought by the Illi-
nois Attorney General. The statutory provisions authorizing ac-
tion by the state's attorney general are less objectionable than
those of the UTPA because proceedings by the Illinois Attorney
General include procedural precautions similar to those availa-
ble under the FTC Act. Scott, therefore, did not test the Illinois
statute to the limits of its applicability.
The Illinois statutory scheme does provide a private cause
of action under which a court "may award actual damages or
any other relief which the court deems proper. '50 An Illinois ap-
pellate court, however, may not follow Scott when the action is
brought by an individual with no prior notice and punitive dam-
ages are awarded. 1 For that reason, Scott is not persuasive pre-
cedent for interpretation of the UTPA.
In Wisconsin the legislature did not enact that state's prohi-
bition against unfair trade practices in the same format as in
other states.2 In State v. Lambert,53 however, parties tested the
45. See id. at 533. In a footnote, the court recommended adopting regulations "to
fill in the interstices of the Alaska Act rather than relying exclusively on adjudication."
Id. at n. 49.
46. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531 (Supp. 1988).
47. See also Watkins v. Roach Cadillac, Inc., 7 Kan. App. 2d 8, 637 P.2d 458 (1981)
(finding the Kansas Consumer Protection Act constitutional, with little discussion, and
citing O'Neill Investigations).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 12112, paras. 261-272 (Supp. 1988).
49. 88 Ill. 2d 279, 291-92, 430 N.E.2d 1012, 1018-19 (1981).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 12112, para. 270a(a) (Supp. 1988).
51. The Illinois Court of Appeals held that punitive damages were assessed prop-
erly in Gent v. Collinsville Volkswagen, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 3d 496, 451 N.E.2d 1385
(1983). That case, however, included a misrepresentation claim, along with an alleged
violation of the Illinois statute. The statute's constitutionality was not contested.
52. See Wis. STAT. §§ 100.18, -.20 (1988); see generally Jeffries, Protection for Con-
[Vol. 40
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constitutionality of the words "unfair trade practices in busi-
ness," the same language found in the UTPA. The Lambert
court expressed concern with the statute's vagueness, but upheld
it against constitutional attack because of the delegation tech-
nique of "filling up the details" of what is prohibited. The court
stated: "[Appellant] argues, however, that [the Wisconsin stat-
ute] is unconstitutionally vague. . . .While that may well be
true in respect to the statute when considered alone, the tech-
nique employed by the legislature. . . is designed to give speci-
ficity . . .,.
A number of other state decisions generally support their
state's consumer protection acts as constitutional, but these
cases are not directly on point. The decisions are distinguishable
because they test more specific words of proscription,55 inter-
twine the vagueness issue with first amendment issues,56 or treat
the vagueness issue too summarily to be helpful.
57
III. VAGUENESS ANALYSIS
A. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court
The void-for-vagueness doctrine in criminal cases arose
from decisions construing statutes that provided no standard by
which criminality could be ascertained. 58 Whether a statute ade-
quately identifies proscribed conduct is not amenable to such
clear-cut analysis; no matter how particularly words of a statute
describe the prohibited conduct, marginal situations that are
open to interpretation will always exist. Thus, the vagueness in-
quiry requires judicial line drawing. The Supreme Court ob-
sumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 559 (1974) (describing
statutory framework and legislative actions).
53. 68 Wis. 2d 523, 229 N.W.2d 622 (1975).
54. Id. at 530, 229 N.W.2d at 625.
55. See, e.g., State ex rel. People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr.
284 (1972); People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gym of Am., Inc., 177 Colo. 97, 493 P.2d 660 (1972);
State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1971); Sanborn
v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 512 P.2d 416 (1973); Kugler v. Market Dev.
Corp., 124 N.J. Super. 314, 306 A.2d 489 (Ct. Ch. Div. 1973).
56. See, e.g., Carpets by the Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis.
1973).
57. See, e.g., State v. Fey, 87 Misc. 2d 987, 386 N.Y.S.2d 549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania APSCO Sys., 10 Pa. Commw. 138, 309 A.2d 184 (1973).
58. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 n.2 (1939).
6491989]
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served: "That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult
to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situa-
tion falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambigu-
ous to define a criminal offense." 59 Further, "the law is full of
instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly,
that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of de-
gree."60 The definition must come from the usual process of "ju-
dicial inclusion and exclusion," 61 since attempts to articulate a
general rule result in unhelpful statements such as that originat-
ing in Connally v. General Construction Co.:6 2 "[A] statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first es-
sential of due process of law."6
The Supreme Court provides little guidance that is helpful
outside the facts of the particular case before it. The standard of
specificity is stated in very broad terms, often borrowed from
cases testing criminal statutes. 4 For instance, the Court applied
the standard enunciated in Grayned v. City of Rockford"5 in Vil-
lage of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,6
which found a drug paraphernalia ordinance sufficiently specific
to survive a vagueness challenge. The Court set forth the follow-
ing test: "[W] e insist that laws give the person of ordinary intel-
ligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. . . . [Further,] laws must provide
explicit standards for those who apply them."6
Thus, Hoffman Estates evinces a fluid test for vagueness
with no sharp lines drawn between statutes establishing crimi-
nal, quasi-criminal, or civil penalties.68 Rather, a variety of fac-
59. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1957) (quoting United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947)).
60. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
61. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
62, 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
63. Id. at 391.
64. See generally 40 L. Ed. 2d 823 annot. at 826 (1975) (titled Supreme Court's
Application of Vagueness Doctrine to Noncriminal Statutes or Ordinances).
65. 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding anti-noise statute against a vagueness attack).
66. 455 U.S. 489, reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 950 (1982).
67. Id. at 498 (quoting Grayred, 408 U.S. at 109).
68. "The Court has. . . expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather
than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less
[Vol. 40
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tors must be considered, including whether the contested law in-
volves economic regulation,69 a scienter requirement,"0 or the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.1
Absent a particular fact situation, analysis of the constitu-
tionality of the UTPA must be made on the facial validity of the
statute. Hoffman Estates, a facial challenge on vagueness
grounds, established an almost insurmountable standard for fa-
cial challenges to economic, remedial regulation: "To succeed
. . . the complainant must demonstrate that the law is imper-
missibly vague in all of its applications. '72 Thus, although the
defendant, Flipside, admittedly was not apprised of whether the
ordinance's proscriptions applied to some of its retail items, its
vagueness challenge failed because the ordinance did apply to
some of the items.
The Supreme Court commented on the vagueness require-
ments in Kolender v. Lawson,73 which invalidated a California
loitering statute requiring "credible and reliable '74 identification
upon police request. In Kolender the Court recognized two dan-
gers in the overly vague statute: the lack of notice to potential
defendants and arbitrary enforcement.7  The clear danger of
such arbitrary enforcement as found in Kolender is not as signif-
severe." Id. at 498-99.
69. "[E]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its sub-
ject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands
to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of
action." Id. at 498 (footnote omitted). Interestingly, this statement suggests less-than-
strict adherence to the legal fiction that all are presumed to know the law. See infra
notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
70. "[T]he Court has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's
vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his
conduct is proscribed." 455 U.S. at 499.
71. "[P]erhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution
demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of associ-
ation, a more stringent vagueness test should apply." Id.
72. Id. at 497 (emphasis added). The Court addressed the argument that the ordi-
nance "warrant[ed] a relatively strict test" because it was "quasi-criminal" in nature. Id.
at 499-500. The Court did not rule on the question because the plaintiff conceded that
point. Id. at 500 n.16. Significantly, the court ruled that defendant Flipside's claim of
vagueness failed "under the test appropriate to either a quasi-criminal or a criminal
law." Id. at 500.
73. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970).
75. See 461 U.S. at 355, 361.
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icant a consideration in quasi-criminal statutes such as the
UTPA, which is enforced by the wronged individual. Although
the state attorney general's office also has the right to prosecute
UTPA claims, state resources are too scarce to cover any but the
most egregious violations. 6
If the UTPA is found to be penal, thereby justifying strict
scrutiny, it should be found unconstitutional. Hearing an appeal
from the District Court of South Carolina, the Supreme Court
demonstrated just how strictly a penal statute should be con-
strued.77 Bouie v. City of Columbia involved South Carolina's
criminal trespass statute.78 Although the Court noted that the
statute was "admirably narrow and precise '79 by prohibiting
"entry upon the lands of another . . . after notice . . . prohibit-
ing such entry,"80 it held that the defendants, who previously
had been asked to leave the complainant's premises, did not
have notice that the refusal was unlawful.8 ' One should note,
however, that Bouie arose from a lunch counter sit-in demon-
stration during the civil rights movement of the early 1960s.
Therefore, its rigid standard of specificity perhaps is limited to
the Civil Rights conflict.
Analysis of ad hoc determinations of vagueness is not espe-
cially helpful in determining whether the particular words of the
UTPA are overly vague. Cases such as Bouie, for example, give
only general guidelines concerning the constitutional require-
ment of specificity.8 2 State court decisions are more helpful
when they construe very similar words, 3 but even these deci-
sions do not analyze the words alone on their face. The ques-
tions, then, are: (1) Do the words "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices . . . give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden"? 4 (2) Are they so
vague that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
76. See Day, supra note 2, at 509.
77. See Boule v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
78. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-600 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (previously codified as S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-386 (Law. Co-op. 1962)).
79. 378 U.S. at 351.
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-600 (1976).
81. See 378 U.S. at 363.
82. See, e.g., id. at 351.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 22-50.
84. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
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at [their] meaning and differ as to [their] application"?85 (3) Do
they require persons "to speculate as to [their] meaning"?86
B. FTC Reference
The intentionally broad language of the UTPA is the most
important characteristic of the Act that compels close scrutiny.
The words "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" alone may not
be sufficient to provide a defendant with notice of the unlawful-
ness of his conduct as required by the due process clauses of the
federal and state constitutions.8 7 For this reason, the UTPA in-
structs South Carolina courts to be guided by FTC and federal
court interpretations of the FTC Act. 8 This reference, however,
does not clearly cure any vagueness problems with the general
proscription.
The critical defect in relying on the reference to the FTC
Act is the fact that the FTC interpretations are not binding on
South Carolina courts. The UTPA does not attempt to incorpo-
rate federal case law because under section 39-5-20(b), courts
are merely "guided" by federal case law. Notably, this weak link
is the only connection between the UTPA and the FTC and fed-
eral court interpretations. The UTPA cannot or does not en-
velop federal case law as binding precedent because to do so
might result in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.8 9 That being so, an appealingly straight-forward argu-
ment can be made that the reference to federal case law fails to
augment the statute properly: (1) We are presumed to know the
law; (2) federal case law does not acquire the force of state con-
sumer protection law; (3) therefore, a potential defendant can-
not be charged with knowledge of the federal case law for pur-
poses of alleged UTPA violations.
Additionally, federal precedent is not helpful if the defend-
ant's conduct involves some novel scheme. No precedent will be
squarely on point; indeed, an avowed purpose of the broad stat-
85. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
86. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
87. See, e.g., FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920) (recognizing that the words
"unfair methods of competition" were in dispute).
88. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
89. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 86
S.E.2d 466 (1955).
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utory language is to encompass new and inventive schemes.90
Therefore, existing federal cases will be of no value in defining
the proscriptions of the UTPA. Basing a finding of constitution-
ality solely on the UTPA's reference to federal precedence is an
empty genuflection.
C. Penal/Remedial Distinction
If reference to the FTC Act fails to provide supporting defi-
nition to general prohibitions of the UTPA, the words of pro-
scription are left to stand alone against the challenge of vague-
ness. The degree of scrutiny applied in a vagueness analysis
depends on whether the statutory damages recoverable under
the UTPA are classified as punitive or remedial. Remedial
causes of action require less stringent tests of vagueness than
punitive causes of action.91
A band of "gray area" always will exist between permitted
and unpermitted conduct. The constitutional question is: How
wide may that gray area be? If the statute is penal, the band of
gray area must be very narrow; if remedial, the gray area may be
wider.
The UTPA can be regarded as remedial because it gives a
remedy where none existed previously. Simultaneously, it can be
regarded as penal because it establishes a standard of conduct.
One must not underestimate the importance of whether the
damage provision is characterized as penal or remedial. As noted
in one commentary on South Carolina law:
A penal ... statute sets up a standard of conduct; establishing
a line of demarcation between that which is legal and illegal.
Such line should, at all times, be unwavering and steady, for it
is necessary that the people be clearly apprised of the point at
which the right ends and the wrong begins.92
The Constitution does not require exemplary damages to be
characterized as punitive. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
90. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolve Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1965).
91. See Lund v. Gray Line Water Tours, Inc., 277 S.C. 447, 289 S.E.2d 404 (1982);
South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health v. Hanna, 270 S.C. 210, 241 S.E.2d 563 (1978).
92. Case Comment, STATUTES - Construction of - Both Remedial and Penal,
2 S.C.L.Q. 188, 189 (1949) (comment on Francis v. Mauldin, 215 S.C. 374, 55 S.E.2d 337
(1949)).
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never ruled that the award of punitive damages should be ac-
companied by the due process guarantees of criminal proceed-
ings, although commentators and lower courts certainly have
considered this issue. 3 Recently, in Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw94 the Supreme Court declined to address the
issue of whether a punitive damages award violated the due pro-
cess, contract, and excessive fines clauses of the Constitution. In
her concurring opinion, however, Justice O'Connor noted that
"because of the punitive character of such awards, there is rea-
son to think that this [law permitting unlimited punitive dam-
ages] may violate the Due Process Clause."95
In Rex Trailer Co. v. United States96 the Supreme Court
considered the characterization of a trebled damages provision
in the context of a double jeopardy challenge. The Court ruled
that the provision was "civil" rather than penal in nature, defer-
ring to Congress's description of the remedy.97 The Court simi-
larly relegated the issue to one of statutory construction in
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms.9 8 The Court
held that an owner of firearms could be subject to an in rem
forfeiture proceeding despite having been acquitted of unlawful
trading in firearms because the forfeiture proceeding was civil in
nature.9 The owner of the firearms objected to the second pro-
ceeding on double jeopardy grounds. The Court observed:
Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction
in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy
clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a sec-
ond time to punish criminally, for the same offense. The ques-
tion for decision is thus whether [the monetary penalty] im-
poses a criminal sanction. That question is one of statutory
93. See, e.g., Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983).
94. 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988).
95. Id. at 1655 (O'Connor, concurring). Justice O'Connor cited two reasons for the
constitutional concern: that the amount of damages was unpredictable and that punitive
damages are already forbidden in defamation suits and some labor suits. See id.
96. 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
97. Id. at 151.
98. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
99. The Court applied a two-prong test of statutory construction: (1) whether Con-
gress indicated a preference for one label (penal or remedial) or the other and (2)
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate that in-
tention. See id. at 362.
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interpretation. 100
The real reason that courts hesitate to identify the issue as
implicating constitutional rights is that punitive damages mas-
querading as "civil" penalties have crept gradually into the law.
These penalties have become so pervasive that to draw the line
now might be considered too much an impingement on the
states' police powers. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recog-
nized this rationale in Irey v. Occupational Safety & Health Re-
view Commission.1°1 The employer-petitioner in Irey objected to
application of a "civil penalty" for willful violations of OSHA
regulations without the protections afforded criminal defend-
ants. The court of appeals reasoned:
In the case sub judice, candor compels us to concede that
the punitive aspects of the OSHA penalties, particularly for a
"willful" violation, are far more apparent than any "remedial"
features .... In any event, we have now come too far down
the road to hold that a civil penalty may not be assessed to
enforce observance of legislative policy.0 2
The UTPA's trebled damages provision should not be ac-
cepted so readily as "civil" for purposes of due process scrutiny.
Courts impose criminal penalties primarily to punish and deter
- the same reasons they impose punitive damages. 1 3 Perhaps
blurring the distinction between damages awarded in civil and
criminal cases is inconvenient, but this may be constitutionally
necessary if there is no analytical difference.
A chief consideration in characterizing a remedy is whether
the wrong sought to be remedied is a public wrong or a private
wrong. "The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and pri-
mary sense, is whether the wrong sought to be addressed is a
wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual . .. ."I" As
100. Id. at 359 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (bracketed
words included in Court's quote)).
101. 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub noma. Intercounty Constr. Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 423 U.S. 1072 (1977).
102. Id. at 1204.
103, See Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (punitive damages awarded
"to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future' occurrence").
104. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892). See also Mendygral v. City of
New Haven, 21 Conn. Supp. 397, 156 A.2d 479 (Super Ct. 1959); Dotty v. State, 197 So.
2d 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191
N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1971); Overmyer v. Eliot Realty, 83 Misc. 2d 694, 371 N.Y.S.2d 246
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with other private causes of action, the private wrong nudges the
individual to take up the mantle of private attorney general. It
was the potential harm to the public, however, that initially
prompted the legislature to allow private causes of action.
Exemplary damages under the UTPA may be more objec-
tionable than ordinary exemplary damages because no cause of
action exists without a public, as well as private, interest in the
outcome. The entire social context of consumer-protection legis-
lation suggests this public interest dimension. 10 5 Similarly, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals held that impact upon the
public interest was a necessary element for recovery under the
UTPA. 106 Public interest is a necessary element under corre-
sponding acts10 in Massachusetts, 08  Georgia, 09  Illinois, 0
Washington,"' and North Carolina." 2 FTC actions also require
a clear impact on the public interest." 3 Infusion of a public in-
terest requirement into the UTPA cause of action thereby ren-
ders the cause of action inapplicable unless there is a public, as
well as a private, wrong. Therefore, since the wrong sought to be
redressed is a public wrong, the UTPA is more properly charac-
terized as penal than remedial.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
105. See Note, Consumer Protection and the Proposed "South Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act," 22 S.C.L. REv. 767 (1970).
106. See Noack Enters. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc., 290
S.C. 475, 479, 351 S.E.2d 347, 350 (Ct. App. 1986). The South Carolina Supreme Court
alluded to the requirement in State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 278 S.C. 281, 285, 294
S.E.2d 781, 782 (1982) (citing with approval United States Retail Credit Ass'n v. FTC,
300 F.2d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 1962)). See also Business Law, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 40 S.C.L. REv. 22 (1988).
107. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash.
2d 778, 719 P.2d'531 (1986); see also Annotation, Practices Forbidden by State Decep-
tive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R.3D 449(1979).
108. See Begelfer v. Najarian, 381 Mass. 177, 409 N.E.2d 167 (1980).
109. See Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 84, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 (1980).
110. See Evanston Motor Co. v. Mid-Southern Toyota Distrib., 436 F. Supp. 1370,
1374 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
111. See Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wash. 2d 331, 334, 544 P.2d 88, 90 (1976).
112. North Carolina authority for this proposition is not as solid as in the other
jurisdictions cited. Compare United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1983) with Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539,
276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), and Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 266
S.E.2d 610 (1980). North Carolina interpretations of its Unfair Trade Practices Act may
be particularly persuasive in South Carolina, however. See infra text accompanying note
102.
113. See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 27 (1929).
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D. South Carolina Statutory Construction
South Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act is one "whose
legislative heritage and judicial interpretation closely parallel
North Carolina's."'114 The North Carolina Court of Appeals in
Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc."5 held that North Carolina's ver-
sion of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (NCUTPA) had multiple
objectives, of which only one was penal in nature. Therefore, ac-
cording to the court, the statute could not be deemed penal in
nature. In Holley the court identified three major objectives of
the trebled damages provision of the NCUTPA and UTPA: (1)
to provide individuals with an incentive to pursue private causes
of action, thus assisting the State in enforcement; (2) to provide
a remedy to injured parties; and (3) to serve as a deterrent to
future violations." 6 In North Carolina the distinguishing charac-
teristic of a penal statute is that it is solely penal in nature.1
1 7
The NCUTPA was held remedial in Holley for the purpose of
determining what statute of limitations should apply, but pre-
sumably the statute also would be considered remedial for pur-
poses of constitutional analysis.
In other jurisdictions similar acts generally are held to be
remedial rather than penal. For instance, in Commonwealth v.
Monumental Properties, Inc.18 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania authorized a liberal construction of the state's consumer
protection law, which employs language identical to the UTPA.
In doing so, the Pennsylvania court trotted out the Supreme
Court's classic explanation of the distinction between remedial
and penal:
In one sense, every law imposing a penalty or a forfeiture may
be deemed a penal law; in another sense, such laws are deemed,
and truly deserved to be called, remedial. The [upper court]
judge was therefore strictly accurate, when he stated that "it
must not be understood that every law which imposes a pen-
alty is, therefore, legally speaking, a penal law, that is, a law
114. Itco Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42, 48 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd on re-
hearing, 742 F.2d 170 (1984).
115. 43 N.C. App. 229, 237, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6-7 (1979).
116. See id. at 237, 259 S.E.2d at 6.
117. See State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney, Co., 292 N.C. 311, 319, 233 S.E.2d
895, 900 (1977).
118. 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).
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which is to be construed with great strictness in favor of the
defendant. Laws enacted for the prevention of fraud, for the
suppression of a public wrong, or to effect a public good, are
not in the strict sense, penal acts, although they may inflict a
penalty for violating them. '1 9
Because the articulated standards on vagueness are them-
selves vague, the only guidance to be found on the proper level
of scrutiny comes from analysis of cases interpreting various ver-
sions of the Model Act in other jurisdictions. Three decisions,
State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc.,2 0 Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, Interna-
tional,121 and State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc.,22 held the
challenged acts to be remedial rather than penal. Accordingly, in
all three cases the state courts rejected constitutional challenges.
Whether the courts would have reached a different conclusion
by scrutinizing the statute by more stringent standards is an
open question. In O'Neill Investigations, a decision that is par-
ticularly helpful in construing the UTPA, the court devoted ex-
tensive discussion to whether the Alaska Act was penal or
remedial.1
23
Pennington v. Singleton 24 is particularly relevant authority
because the court began its analysis with the premise that the
statute was penal. Under the Pennington court's analysis, the
language of an act similar to the UTPA survived the even more
stringent standards of specificity required of criminal statutes.
The penal characterization, however, was only one of several fac-
tors considered. Furthermore, the statute was one regulating
business activity, and an intent or knowledge requirement was
not material to the vagueness inquiry.
25
When drawing the line on the specificity requirement,
courts certainly are swayed by the determination that a statute
119. 459 Pa. at 459 n.10, 329 A.2d at 816 n.10 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 197, 210 (1844)).
120. 82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d 233 (1973). See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying
text.
121. 88 Ill. 2d 279, 430 N.E.2d 1012 (1982). See supra notes 49-51 and accompany-
ing text.
122. 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980). See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
123. See id. at 525-28.
124. 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
125. See id. at 689.
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regulates business activity.'26 The reasoning behind this latitude
in interpretation is that businesses are more capable than indi-
viduals of becoming acquainted with the regulating law. 127 Acts
similar to the UTPA have been regarded as business regula-
tion,'128 and a South Carolina court construing the UTPA likely
would reach a similar result. Nevertheless, it is a dangerous pro-
position to accept Pennington as authority for approving UTPA
language under penal standards merely because it is a form of
business regulation. The rationale for liberal interpretation does
not fit the facts of Pennington. The defendant in that case was
not a business but, rather, an individual selling his boat to an-
other individual. He had never sold a boat previously and was
not in the business of selling boats.2 9 Perhaps removing the bus-
iness-regulation factor from the analysis would have changed
Pennington's result.
Aside from constitutional grounds, the chief argument
against characterizing the damages as remedial is that statuto-
rily created awards that exceed compensatory damages are in
derogation of common law and, therefore, should be strictly con-
strued.130 South Carolina courts are free to choose whether to
construe the UTPA strictly or liberally, since it is not clear
whether the Act is remedial or penal.
The public versus private wrong distinction probably would
be of little analytic value since the securities laws in general
have been regarded as remedial,' 3' and those laws seem to have
the same public interest aspect as the UTPA. The South Caro-
lina Court of Appeals indicated a willingness to defer to a liberal
reading of the portion of the UTPA authorizing civil penalties,
even where such imposition accumulates to result in a heavy
fine. 132
In Francis v. Mauldin33 the South Carolina Supreme Court
126. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
127. See id. at 162.
128. See Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, Int'l, 88 Ill. 2d 279, 430
N.E.2d 1012 (1982); Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980); State v. Ralph
Williams' N. W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d 233 (1973).
129. See 606 S.W.2d at 685.
130. See Jones v. Sportelli, 166 N.J. Super. 383, 399 A.2d 1047 (Ct. Law Div. 1979).
131. See McGaha v. Mosley, 283 S.C. 268, 273, 322 S.E.2d 461, 464 (Ct. App. 1984).
132. See State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct.
App. 1984) (eleven separate $5,000 fines imposed for a total of $55,000).
133. 215 S.C. 374, 55 S.E.2d 337 (1949).
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resolved the classification issue regarding statutes providing
causes of action against gambling winners. The court held that
the statute, which provides the loser a cause of action against
the winner, was remedial and, therefore, liberally construed.
134
The court also held a related statute that provided a cause of
action for "any other person" with trebled damages to be penal
in nature. 135 Francis is helpful because it implicitly emphasizes
the distinction between private and public wrongs. Nevertheless,
the statutes disputed in Francis differ from the UTPA; there-
fore, this case is not conclusive of the issue in South Carolina.
The cause of action provided to the gambling loser does not au-
thorize trebled damages," 6 presumably on the theory that the
loser is not entirely innocent himself. The cause of action pro-
vided to "any other person," while it does authorize trebled
damages, also requires the successful plaintiff to remit half the
judgment to the county where the gambling occurred.
13 7
South Carolina courts acknowledge the blurred distinction
between penal and remedial statutes. In State ex rel. Moody v.
Stem 38 the South Carolina Supreme Court strictly construed a
statute imposing a penalty for failure to keep tobacco warehous-
ing statistics.13 9 This statute characterized violations as misde-
meanors. Those found guilty, however, were "punish[able]
within the discretion of the court and, in addition thereto,
[were] subject to a penalty of five hundred dollars, to be sued for
in the county in which the offender resides." 40 Although the ac-
tion in Stem was a civil proceeding, the court noted, "[I]t is im-
material, for the purpose of the application of the rule of strict
construction, whether the proceedings for the enforcement of
the penal law, be criminal or civil." 4 The five-hundred-dollar
penalty is included in a statute characterizing violations as mis-
134. See id. at 381, 55 S.E.2d at 240.
135. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-10, -20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
136. See id. § 32-1-10.
137. See id. § 32-1-20. This, of course, could still be a substantial windfall to a party
who has incurred no loss himself.
138. 213 S.C. 465, 50 S.E.2d 175 (1948).
139. The South Carolina Legislature repealed the statute in issue in Stem. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 39-19-280 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988). For the purposes of this article,
however, Stem still stands for the propositions discussed in the text accompanying this
note.
140. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-19-280 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988) (repealed 1986).
141. 213 S.C. at 468, 50 S.E.2d at 176.
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demeanors, but the penalty itself is not clearly criminal or civil.
In this context, normally "civil" penalties are assessed. Stem ap-
pears to be authority for the proposition that statutes authoriz-
ing criminal penalties in the guise of civil penalties will be con-
strued strictly. Closer examination and comparison to other
cases, however, indicates that Stem is authority only for the pro-
position that the courts will defer to legislative characterization
of statutes without further investigation.
The argument that statutes authorizing civil penalties are
actually penal is strengthened in Lund v. Gray Line Water
Tours, Inc.142 The trial court in Lund authorized a double rent
assessment against a holdover tenant. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court disapproved the double assessment because the
plaintiff did not plead the statute authorizing the award. The
court reasoned, citing Stem, that the strict construction of penal
statutes dictated this result.'4" The statute authorizing the
double award does not characterize the penalty as civil or crimi-
nal. Rather, it requires the holdover tenant to "forfeit double
the value of the use of the premises, recoverable by action.""'
Thus, like the penalties under the UTPA, the penalty under the
Lund statute appears to be clearly "civil."
Following Francis and Stem, a South Carolina court proba-
bly would defer to the legislative characterization of UTPA treb-
led damages as civil, classify the statute as remedial, and con-
strue it liberally. Lund, however, is strong authority to the
contrary. Cases from other jurisdictions, construing statutes
other than the UTPA, provide little guidance in determining
how a South Carolina court will resolve the penal-remedial
distinction.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Standard
Oil Co.14 invalidated a statute prohibiting discriminatory pric-
ing among different sections of a city or town. The court held
the statute unconstitutional because it failed to define by
breadth or type the term "section."' 46 The court's analysis cen-
tered on whether persons potentially affected by the statute
142. 277 S.C. 447, 289 S.E.2d 404 (1982).
143. See id. at 451, 289 S.E.2d at 406.
144. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-35-170 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
145. 195 S.C. 267, 10 S.E.2d 778 (1940).
146. See id. at 283, 10 S.E.2d at 786.
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must "necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.
14 7
An infinite variety of representations or schemes could be
regarded as deceptive to one person but descriptive to another.
A person's perception will change as he views the scheme or rep-
resentation prospectively (before losing money) and then retro-
spectively (after losing his shirt). A given practice might be re-
garded favorably at first as an innovative business approach.
Later, the same practice might be regarded by a money loser as
deceptive because the approach was unfamiliar. Business per-
sons may be dissuaded from engaging in practices within the
gray area, which includes both innovative, laudable business
practices as well as criminally deceptive practices. The question
remains whether, as a matter of economics, the net benefit to
society is greater when the law attempts to reach so far ahead to
quash as yet unconceived plans.
E. Notice
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has two purposes: (1) to as-
sure that potential defendants have notice of the unlawfulness of
their conduct and (2) to prevent arbitrary enforcement.14 The
willfulness requirement of the UTPA may fulfill the notice as-
pect of this doctrine, but it does not affect the opportunity for
arbitrary enforcement. The arbitrary enforcement component
alone, however, is not grounds for ruling the UTPA void for
vagueness.
Prevention of arbitrary enforcement certainly is a desirable
public policy.' 49 Note, however, that this public policy is not as
soundly rooted in the Constitution as is the notice rationale of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The Court noted in Smith v.
Goguen'50 that "[w]here inherently vague statutory language
permits . . . selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due
147. See id. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
148. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
149. "IT]he more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice,
but the other principal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.'" Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
150. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
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process."1"1 This concern over arbitrary enforcement is not as
clearly a part of due process as the essentials of notice and hear-
ing. Courts tolerate a certain amount of arbitrariness - most
noticeably regarding prosecutorial discretion,152 and implicitly
with the approval of statutes that generally encourage private
attorneys general.153
The private-plaintiff UTPA cause of action does not create
the same arbitrariness concerns as police-enforced criminal stat-
utes. Arguably, the arbitrariness portion of the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine has no constitutional foundation at all. Striking
down a statute on the public policy ground of arbitrary enforce-
ment is inappropriate because the legislature is presumed al-
ready to have weighed the conflicting public policies. Thus,
under the UTPA, the only constitutional component of the void-
for-vagueness doctrine is the notice component.
Due process requires notice to potential defendants that
their conduct is unlawful. The UTPA fails to give this notice
because it is vague and lacks procedural safeguards similar those
found in the FTC Act. Proponents of the state acts allege that
the willfulness requirement cures these defects in the "Little
FTC" acts. Proponents further argue that, by definition, a de-
fendant has notice of a willful violation that occurs "when the
party committing the violation knew or should have known that
his conduct was a violation of [the general proscription of the
UTPA].M 54 This is an appealingly straightforward argument,
but it requires closer examination. If the words "unfair" and
"deceptive" fail to identify prohibited conduct because they are
vague, how can one "willfully" engage in the prohibited con-
duct? Defendants only would be subject to trebled damages lia-
bility when they actually knew their conduct clearly violated the
Act, for example, when a court previously found identical con-
duct objectionable and the defendant had actual knowledge of
that particular decision. Undoubtably, the legislature did not in-
tend so restrictive a definition of "willful."
The primary constitutional attack on the UTPA centers on
151. Id. at 576.
152. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
153, See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (anti-
trust private cause of action).
154, S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(d) (1976).
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the legal fiction that all are presumed to know the law. Even if
the UTPA's reference to federal precedents provides meaningful
guidance, a potential defendant realistically cannot be expected
to realize the unlawfulness of his conduct, particularly when no
federal decisions are factually on point. There is no avoiding the
fact that conduct will continue to be measured by no other stan-
dard than that of the words "unfair" or "deceptive."
Civil defendants frequently are found to be negligent and
are required to pay punitive damages. A finding of "unfair,"
however, seems qualitatively different. A person's perception of
what is negligent is probably more in line with common under-
standing. There is no such common understanding for "fairness"
or "deceptiveness." Individuals are less likely to agree.
The words "unfair" or "deceptive" might be considered suf-
ficient based on the principle that we generally know right from
wrong, good from bad, honest from dishonest, and, therefore,
fair from unfair. The common law has developed on this princi-
ple. Indeed, as in many other areas of civil and criminal law, the
difference between right and wrong is drawn on an external
standard to which all are held. As Justice Holmes observed:
[Wihen we are dealing with that part of the law which aims
more directly than any other at establishing standards of con-
duct, we should expect there more than elsewhere to find that
the tests of liability are external, and independent of the de-
gree of evil in the particular person's motives or intentions.
The conclusion follows directly from the nature of the stan-
dards to which conformity is required .... They do not
merely require that every man should get as near as he can to
the best conduct possible for him. They require him at his own
peril to come up to a certain height.'55
The common law implicitly recognized the concept of defin-
ing one's conduct according to an external standard "at his
peril." Explicitly, the Supreme Court observed, "[T]he law is
full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating
rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some mat-
ter of degree."'15 6
155. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1923). This quotation comes from Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes's discussion of the criminal law. Justice Holmes made similar
comments on torts, trespass, and negligence. See id. at 107-13.
156. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
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The principle that all are held to an external standard of
conduct also rests on the assumption that all are presumed to
know the law. When the law, the standard to which we are held,
is as difficult to perceive as the "fairness" requirement of the
UTPA, the fiction needs re-examination.
Inroads have been made into the legal fiction, but by impli-
cation only. For example, the Supreme Court in Hoffman Es-
tates commented that business regulation statutes required a
lesser standard of specificity because businesses could be ex-
pected to consult relevant legislation to ensure compliance.
157
Obviously, the Court is willing at least to inquire into the ability
of a class of potential defendants to know the law. Another way
of stating the reasoning of Hoffman Estates is that individuals
have a lesser burden of defining the applicable standard of con-
duct than businesses. It is reasonable to take into account the
ability of those subject to the law to understand it when scruti-
nizing a particular statute for vagueness.
Regarding the UTPA, the meaning of the words "unfair"
and "deceptive" are particularly open to dispute. The words do
not immediately call to mind a standard, however subjective, by
which to measure one's conduct. The direction that courts "are
to be guided" by federal precedent is of little help even for busi-
nesses, since it is unlikely that any case is factually on point.
Thus, a stricter standard of scrutiny is appropriate in a vague-
ness challenge to the UTPA.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
UTPA against a vagueness challenge, this ruling deserves re-ex-
amination. The UTPA allows (1) trebled damages with (2) no
prior judicial order for (3) violation of a statute that is very
broad on its face. Even though each of these three characteris-
tics alone may be unobjectionable, together they raise the con-
cern that a person or a business may conduct its activities in
good faith only to be slapped with a punitive fine. The UTPA is
not constitutionally sound.
157. 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
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